Abstract-Turkey had its first experience of democracy in the 1950 elections. Later on, however, the country failed to achieve democratic consolidation because of 3 military coups, allowing the elements of military guardianship to cast a shadow on the political regime. With democracy efforts predominantly seen under stable, single party governments, Turkey has regained a positive momentum in terms of democracy, especially following the 2002 elections. This study will outline the elements of military guardianship, and set light to the structural reforms aimed at eliminating it after 2002.
with the 1961 Constitution and reached to its climax through institutionalization by the 1982 Constitution, the armed forces' privilege was secured in three ways: privileges and powers acquired through the coups, the military jurisdiction, and the continuation of status quo through manipulation of fear.
Referred to as "exit-guarantees" in literature, these privileges [1] are certain conserved areas and powers secured by the army through the 1960 coup with the aim of occupying a strong position in the decision making processes under constitutional guarantee. Within this context the 1961 Constitution (Article 110) entitled the members of the National Unity Committee as "natural senators" of the Republican Senate, and it positioned the Chief of General Staff (who was previously reporting to the Ministry of National Defense as per 1924 Constitution) under the Prime Minister. The National Security Council (N.S.C.) was initially designed by the 1961 Constitution (Article 111), which granted exemption to the members of National Unity Committee and its executors (Provisional Article 4), and secured a judicial immunity for the juristic dispositions accepted in the same period (Provisional Article 4) [2] .
With the memorandum they gave on 12 March 1971, the military involved in politics once again and the constitutional amendments in 1971 and 1973 included paraphrases (Article 111) aimed at strengthening N.S.C. decisions ("shall notify" replaced with "shall suggest"), and it took the Turkish Armed Forces' (T.A.F.) expenditures out of the Court of Accounts' control (Article 127). In an effort to eliminate the unconstitutionality of Military Commission, the "natural judge" principle were turned into "legal judge" (Article 32), and the judicial power of the Military Commission were strengthened (Provisional Article 21). Transition to martial law was made easier through broadening of the reasons for proclamation of martial law (Article 124), and the military authority was granted substantial power within the jurisdiction through establishment of State Security Courts (S.S.C.) (Article 136). The civil jurisdiction was narrowed down through establishment of the Supreme Military Council, and the armed forces were provided with additional privileges through fortification of military influence on the jurisdiction [2] .
Preserving the privileges given to the military through the 1971 and 1973 amendments, the 1982 Constitution hasreinforced the military power even further through the below mentioned authorities and privileges. In this context, [3] . In brief, with every military intervention Turkish democracy was deeply wounded, and the army's privileges within the system grew even bigger, becoming increasingly more established. Thus the armed forces' possession of remarkably strong authorities that can be used during civil government process, and its subjection of elected civil administrators to the military's preferences through those authorities have become integral parts of Turkish political scene [4] .
III. THE MILITARY JURISDICTION
Another step taken in the jurisdiction with the aim of strengthening the army after the May 27 coup d'état was restriction of judicial control on the military through new arrangements. Military jurisdiction and military higher jurisdiction organs were included into the Constitution; military jurisdiction was drawn as a constitutional institution, and it turned into an autonomous institution independent from judicial justice. Ümit Cizre defines this kind of military jurisdiction as "a government partner that locks its very own existence onto a perception of threat and security sanctifying and safeguarding the State, i.e. onto existence of 'others', and that identifies those "others" by itself." [5] According to her, army acts as a "guardian" within the political system and it acquires certain privileges to itself through this role. In order to preserve the said privileges and its hegemony over the political system, it has to be effective in the political area. And in order for this interference to be effective and gain an institutional continuity, it should be held out of judicial control. This unique military justice system, the foundations of which were laid broadly by the 1961 Constitution, helped the armed forces use this area arbitrarily within the system. In fact, using this facility to the furthest extent, the military interfered with social life directly on May 27, March 12, and September 12, and indirectly on February 28 and as a result it secured continuity of its dominant position.
IV. SUSTAINING THE SYSTEM THROUGH MANIPULATION OF FEAR
Continuity of a guardianship regime depends on the people's approval and consent to such regime. Therefore, the actors who are executors of the guardianship regime utilize certain mechanisms to justify their position in the public opinion. The most important one among these mechanisms is fear. The fear is pumped into society through fabrication of certain internal and external threats in an effort to legitimate the guardianship regime's role as the country's protector against such enemies and threats. These mechanisms for "manufacturing consent" are in fact mechanisms for manipulation of fear, from which the national security state gets its strength. With priorities changing from time to time, several internal and external threats (such as P.K.K., the Kurdish problem, economic issues within Turkey, and intentions of European Union, Russia, and Neighboring countries over Turkey) [6] were injected into the public opinion, securing continuity of the guardianship regime.
This regime in Turkey has long been subject to serious criticism both within the country and at international level. Nevertheless, within this context, political governments did try to implement significant reforms with the aim of improving the standards of democracy in Turkey. While the coalition governments established before 2000s have also made certain efforts, the political instability and economic problems combined with the pro-guardianship and elitist bureaucratic structure that stands over governments averted the country from attaining world-class democratic norms. That said, Turkey's political era between 2002 and 2012 is especially important in terms of democratic development. The main reason for this is the era's pro-guardianship actors' clear and effective intentions to oppress the political power, which later led the political power to implement various reforms as a reaction. The other reasons that make this period important are the very strong parliamentary majority supporting the political government, and the very important reforms on democracy, state of law, and human rights.
This study aims to discuss the positive and negative aspects of the reforms made within this period. In Turkey, the public opinion's wishes for implementation of structural reforms in the judicial order fall short. For this reason the political will must realize initiatives aimed at those reforms. Nevertheless, in an environment where the bureaucratic pro-guardianship structure is believed to be protected strictly by its own actors, any step aimed at changing the status quo may encounter resistance. Therefore, realization of changes that may be designated as a wave of democratization requires strong and committed political governments. In order for such reforms to be implemented, also a stable period is needed. This explains why the strong democratization initiatives within 1982 Constitution era fall only to the stable periods under rule of single party governments.
In this context two periods deserve mention: First is the Motherland Party (ANAP) government between 1983 and 1991, and the second one is the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government between 2002 and 2012. In the first period, democratization was surpassed by changes and transformations experienced in the economical area.
However, under Justice and Development Party government, which comprises the second period, it is obvious that the democratization steps taken have been at least as strong as those taken in the economical area. As shown below, while the democratization achievements within this period are very important steps forward, certain critical shortcomings also show that even this government has been insufficient in implementation.
V. DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRACY
While the 1982 Constitution was accepted with a public support as big as 92%, especially the problems it has caused in implementation have led to criticism of the Constitution. The amendments also prove these critics right. Turkey's application to full European Union membership on 14 April 1987 and the Copenhagen Criteria it was required to realize thereafter have also contributed to Turkey's democratization. These criteria, which incorporate three titles including the enhancement of human rights standards, a civil democracy freed from guardianship, and a free market economy, are in fact seen as indispensables of the democratization process in Turkey. The only criticism that may be made on this topic is Turkey's efforts to realize these movements with the influence of international dynamics, instead of using its own domestic dynamics. Nevertheless, thanks to the strong and stable single party government, 2000s also witnessed the weight of domestic dynamics within the democratization process, in addition to the external dynamics.
Since the 1961 Constitution, the concept of guardianship, which has been seen as a fundamental problem over politics, became clearer especially during the single party government periods. In the 1982 Constitution period, both Ozal governments and Erdogan governments felt the intensity of tutelage at different severity levels. Mostly dominated by the National Security Council, the concept of guardianship has been moved to a different dimension where jurisdiction became more effective.
This situation, which may be called as judicial guardianship, showed itself during this period perhaps most intensively since the 1961 Constitution. On one hand, in an activist stance the Constitutional Court annulled laws made by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (G.N.A), which were in compliance with the Constitution and within its discretion, by performing legitimacy controls; confronted the political power's steps on various topics such as privatization, social security, democratization, and state of law; and even exaggerated its activism by questioning the grounds of constitutional amendments realized by this government, and cancelling them. On the other hand, the State Council annulled constitutional steps of governments by exceeding compliance audits, and thus tried to restrict the government's area of movement. When considered in terms of the state of law, while judicial control is necessary, with such controversial decisions taken by exceeding its jurisdiction, the Constitutional Court and the State Council have been subject to heavy criticism.
Under the AK Party government, two important constitutional amendments were made against this pro-guardianship, bureaucratic, elite resistance based on jurisdiction. The first one, which followed a decision [7] taken by the Constitutional Court within the eleventh Presidential election at G.N.A. in 2007, introduced popular vote for Presidential elections. With introduction of popular vote for electing the President, which has been an important actor in the pro-guardianship model as planned by the 1982 Constitution, negativities such as oppression, intimidation, illegality, crisis, etc., which have been experienced during the presidential election processes from time to time since 1961, would be eliminated. Similarly, the 2010 Constitutional amendments became subject of a popular debate. Thus, the fact that these two amendments, which were aimed at eliminating the pro-tutelage structure foreseen by the 1982 Constitution, have been accepted with popular vote actually shows that people also believe that these structural reforms now need to be realized.
These developments show that, in 2000s, not only external dynamics but also grassroots demands have also played a determinant role in the steps taken towards democratization.
In the ten years period, some of the implemented reforms related to democratization, human rights, and state of law, which will be discussed herein, have taken place in form of Constitutional amendments, while others were at legislative level. Some reforms were only focused on a particular topic while others -like those in the 2010 constitutional amendments-covered different topics.
VI. STEPS TAKEN IN THE FIELD OF DEMOCRATIZATION
One of the most important steps taken within the context of demilitarization and assimilation of the guardianship was annulment of the state of emergency in the eastern and southeastern Anatolia. The strong authorities held by administration and effective restrictions on human rights under the state of emergency have caused serious problems. Especially the restrictions on judicial review, which occur under the state of emergency administrations, show the extent of serious worries about human rights in that period. With addition of the armed forces' forcibleness in those days, it can be said that the state of emergency administrations have been one of the major obstacles against democratization. Emerged as result of the terrorist actions experienced during 1980s in certain provinces of Eastern and Southeastern regions of Turkey, the state of emergency had been gradually lifted in some provinces, and it was completely annulled in 30 November 2002. Likewise, the State Security Courts, which had been introduced to the judicial system with 1973 Constitutional amendments, have been subject to continuous criticism about democracy. As result of Turkey's conviction by the European Court of Human Rights (E.C.H.R), which had found Turkey guilty of violating the right of fair trial by assigning a military judge to the State Security Court, attendance of military judges to State Security Court proceedings have been annulled with the Constitutional amendment in 1999 [8] . After that, these courts were completely eliminated in 2004. Later on, the State Security Courts were replaced by specially authorized high criminal courts, which were established to handle organized crimes including but not limited to cases related to national security. Due to the troubles that had been encountered in that decade, the special high criminal courts have also been lifted with the Law No. 6352 dated 02.07.2012 and a new provision in the third judicial package that was adopted.
Another amendment was related to the General Secretariat of the National Security Council. Considered as one of the most important institutions of the pro-guardianship model in Turkey, the National Security Council was initially introduced in the 1961 Constitution, and it continuously gained strength against civil power since then. The seventh harmonization package also included amendments related to the General Secretariat of the National Security Council, and through several changes in the National Security Council, which was adopted with the 2001 Constitution amendment, the dominance of the armed forces started to be reduced ( The amendment paved way for a civil Secretary General for the National Security Council. In fact, the new rules mean that the National Security Council General Secretary will be assigned with the proposal of the Prime Minister, and approval of the President [9] . With the amendment made in 2003, the strengthening of civil politics in the Council should be seen as the second important step.
Constriction of the military jurisdiction is yet another important step towards democratization. In fact, two positive steps in this context deserve mention. [13] . These laws brought important improvements by readdressing the local administrative units in accordance with contemporary requirements. The main characteristic of these laws in terms of democracy is their aim at breaking the central administrations' dominance on local administrations, and moving to a configuration that is more in line with the requirements of democracy.
As With the 2010 Constitutional amendments, steps for reducing the restrictions on judicial control were taken, paving the path for judicial remedy against any kind of promotion procedures and severance decisions (except for the retirements due to lack of staff) of the Supreme Military Council. On the other hand, public servants were given the right to appeal for remedy against warnings and reprimands. Judicial remedies against Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors' (S.B.J.P.) dismissal decisions were also made available. Despite these positive steps, the fact that certain Supreme Military Council (S.M.C.) and S.B.J.P. decisions and President's individual actions are still exempt from remedy are seen as important obstacles for the state of law. With the 2010 Constitutional amendment, the S.B.J.P.'s structure was changed substantially: the number of Board members was increased from 7 to 22, with three members from among judges and prosecutors working at administrative procedure trial courts, seven members from among judges and prosecutors working at courts of original jurisdiction, one member from Turkish Academy of Justice, and four members through president's nomination from among legist faculty members and attorneys. Thus, the Board attained a more mixed and pluralist structure, becoming nearer to a formation that is seen in high judiciary institutions in the European countries [15] .
A similar practice was experienced in the formation of the Constitutional Court: the previous formation, which was comprised of eleven permanent members and four reserve members, was replaced with a formation that is comprised of seventeen permanent members, and the reserve membership status was annulled. With introduction of a term of office limited to 12 years, the practice that allowed the court members to remain in post until 65 years old was also terminated. The fact that G.N.A. is not allowed to nominate any of the members directly can be considered as the most important deficiency regarding the formation of the Constitutional Court. In Europe, in fact, it is impossible to find an example where the national parliament is not allowed to choose a member to this institution. Conversely, in certain countries like Federal Republic of Germany, Poland, and Hungary, all the members of the Constitutional Court are being elected by the parliaments [16] .
The political will has taken aim at developments regarding language, too. In this context the legal barriers against broadcasts in different languages and dialects on private televisions and Turkish Radio Television (T.R. As is known, Turkey had lifted capital punishment for normal periods in 2001. In 2004, the capital punishment was lifted completely including extraordinary situations, and it was totally removed from the legislation. Subsequently, the United Nations and the European Council protocols related to the lift of capital punishment were also approved.
The 2010 Constitutional amendment brought two important reforms in terms of the liberties of political parties. First of all, in political party closure cases, a deputy who has caused its party to be closed will not be dismissed from deputyship. Given that closure is an important sanction for a political party, this reform may also be seen as a positive step. Secondly, any Constitutional Court decision for closure of political parties or for their divestiture from state assistance will require two thirds majority of the attending members. Given that the previous quorum was three fifth, this increase to two thirds has created a more secure situation in terms of political parties' freedoms [17] .
VIII. CONCLUSION
During the single party government of the last decade, the democratization steps taken by the Justice and Development Party have made serious contributions to solution of problems faced by Turkey. In combination with the contributions of developments in the economical field, the reforms related to democracy, human rights, and state of law have also increased Turkey's prestige. However, since Turkey still struggles with important problems in terms of democratization, these steps should be continued in a more determined manner.
Today, while there is no apparent problem related to military guardianship, the actual state should not be considered sufficient and permanent solutions should be introduced. For this reason, the essential constitutional and legal amendments must be made as soon as possible. Accordingly, the General Staff must be linked to the Ministry of National Defense, the National Security Council must be excluded from being a constitutional institution, and the separation of civil-military jurisdiction must be ended through termination of high courts in the field of military justice. The process for the new constitution must be completed successfully. In this process, attention ought to be paid to have all political parties participate to the making of the new constitution.
In fact, following the June 2011 general elections, despite all the difficulties in its formation and decision-making, the first Great National Assembly of Ottoman-Turkish political history that is comprised of merely the people's representatives based on merely people's demands, has started the process for making of a new constitution by forming a commission comprised of equal number of members from each party, without intervention of the actors of guardianship. This new development was indeed extremely important with its demonstration of the political level attained by Turkey. However, the requirement of unanimity for acceptance of articles have prevented the parties from reaching an accord, and caused the process to fail. 
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